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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT IN FLORIDA
JAMES W. MMDLETON

The unwritten law, it is said, may be found in reported cases.
Logically, then, at least a portion of the law of Florida should be found
in the Florida Reports; and there it is, discovered and expressed by
generations of learned justices. On the general question of the weight
to be accorded to the findings of fact of a judicial body1 there are
myriad Florida cases and at times more than one current rule on the
same proposition. Each occasion has prompted a statement of a rule or two or four or five - sometimes with no particular thought to the
effect of these pronouncements on efficient functioning of the lower
courts of this state, and on the practice of law at any judicial level.
The basic premise is that the trial court, or any other agency hearing
the evidence, is the finder of fact, and that the appellate court in the
proper exercise of its jurisdiction is ordinarily confined to questions of
law. A second premise is that some amount of evidence is, as a matter
of law, necessary to sustain findings of fact. If a precise delineation of
that amount of evidence were possible, then the second premise would
demand that a given finding stand or fall.
A precise definition is impossible, however, because of the very
nature of the fact-finding process. Evidence cannot be weighed in
mechanical scales; its weight depends entirely upon its convincing
power, which at best is a subjective determination made by the person
who hears or observes it. An appellate court is of course expected to
2
correct those errors of law appearing as either improper procedure
'See generally, on review of findings of fact, Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial

Review, 56 HA-v. L. REv. 899 (1948); Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70 (1944).
See also 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 181 (1949).
2
E.g., Mathews v. State, 44 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1950). Harmless error does not,
however, warrant reversal, FLA. STAT. §54.28 (1949), Hopkins v. McClure, 45
So.2d 656 (Fla. 1950); and a trial judge should not grant a new trial for such
error, Thomas v. Parliament Loan Corp., 45 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1950).

(281)
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or the application of an incorrect rule of substantive law; 3 this phase
of review occasions little difficulty to the appellate court in deciding
whether to reverse. The real problem is to determine bow far the
appellate court should go in policing those subjective judgments of
the lower court known as "findings of fact." This issue is further complicated by the custom of sometimes regarding a wide departure from
the weight of evidence, resulting in an erroneous conclusion or finding
of fact, as an error of law. In this policing function, are there objective
standards of review, or is each justice merely substituting his judgment
for that of the trial court and ruling on appeal as he would have if he
had been trying the case below? 4 In Porter v. Gordon,5 the circuit
judge found the verdict so inadequate as to ". . . shock the judicial
conscience"; 6 accordingly he awarded a new trial on the issue of
damages only. The Supreme Court prescribed a new trial on the merits,
the precise reason given being that "justice" required it.- In the very
next case reported, justice apparently did not require it, so the judgment for damages was affirmed because the verdict was sustained by
8..."I'
Yet in Feal v. Rodriguez9 the
"... ample substantial evidence .
judgment below was reversed on the question of damages alone, the
contention of appellant being that they were grossly inadequate. The
we think there is
specific reason given for reversal was that "...
merit to this contention." 10
Are there, then, any ascertainable standards or norms governing
review? The cases do not all fit into a logical pattern, but at least
some generalizations are here attempted, in the hope that analysis
may serve to point up the problems currently existing in this field.
3

E.g., Summersett v. Linkroum, 44 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1950).
FLA. STAT. §59.34 (1949) reads as follows: "The court, on an appeal, shall
examine the record and reverse or affirm the judgment, sentence or decree of the
4

court below; give such judgment, sentence, or decree as the court below sh'ould
have given; or otherwise as to it may appear according to law." Despite the
language employed, Section 59.84 does not require the appellate court to place
itself in the position of the trial court upon review; indeed, such a requirement
appears to be beyond the power of the legislature. See Inre Alkire's Estate, 144
Fla. 606, 625, 198 So. 475, 488 (1940) (supplemental opinion).
546 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1950).
Id.at 20.
71bid.
SUpton v. Hutchinson, 46 So.2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1950).
944 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1950).
SOlbid.
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I. TkL CouRT wrr JuRy
1. Directed Verdict
Under Florida practice the trial judge may determine that one of
the parties has failed to submit evidence on which a jury might lawfully find a verdict for such party. Accordingly, upon motion of the
opposite party, he may by directing a verdict eliminate any weighing
of evidence by the jury."- The statutes, however, make no attempt to
define the precise weight of evidence upon which a jury may legally
reach a verdict; instead they leave this determination to the courts.
If either party, on the basis of his evidence taken alone and without
contradictory evidence, fails to prove a controverted cause of action,
he has no more right to a jury trial than he would have if he failed in
the first place to allege a cause of action in his pleading.12 The evidence must at least be sufficient in itself to produce a "reasonable"
belief in the existence of those facts essential to the verdict.18 In the
federal courts this doctrine has been held equivalent to the statutory
rule demanding "substantial" evidence as a prerequisite to an administrative finding; 14 and, indeed, no conceptual distinction between
the two rules can be discovered.' 5 Many Florida cases have held that
unless a party presents substantial evidence a directed verdict for his
16
opponent is proper.
'1 FLA. STAT. §54.17 (1949); F.A. C.L.R. 40(a),(b); cf. Wigginton, New
Florida
Common Law Rules, 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1950).
12
Stevens v. Tampa Elec. Co., 81 Fla. 512, 88 So. 303 (1921).
13Escambia County Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Sutherland, 61 Fla. 167, 55
So. 83 (1911).
14 E.g., NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299
(1939).
' 5 See, e.g., Laney v. Board of Public Instr'n, 153 Fla. 728, 738, 15 So.2d 748,
753 (1943), in which Brown, J., citing the Columbian case, supra note 14, stated
the principle as follows: "This means that there must be evidence which supports
a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can reasonably be inferred.
It must do more than create a suspicion of the fact to be established, and must be
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." See also 9 WiGmoRE, EvmENcE §2494 (3d ed. 1940); Dickinson,
Crowell v. Benson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinationsof Questions
of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1055 (1932).
16E.g., Saucer v. West Palm Beach, 155 Fla. 659, 21 So.2d 452 (1945); Carter
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 138 Fla. 220, 189 So. 705 (1939); Biscayne Trust
Co. v. Pennsylvania Sugar Co., 103 Fla. 155, 137 So. 147 (1931); Stevens v.
Tampa Elec. Co., 81 Fla. 512, 88 So. 303 (1921).
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Under the Florida statutory direction'" the judge may weigh the
total of the evidence for either party, considering it as if uncontroverted, in order to ascertain its overall legal effect, but he is not
empowered to weigh conflicting evidence on a comparative basis. He
determines whether there is substantial evidence to go to the jury,
although in so doing he has of necessity been permitted to rule on the
probative force of the testimony offered, when taken as a whole and
as uncontroverted.' 8 This power of the trial judge must also be kept in
mind when his function of ruling on a motion for new trial is considered; it is in this connection that serious problems arise.
New Florida Common Law Rule 40 provides for a reservation of
decision on a motion for directed verdict when made at the close of all
the evidence, and for a later determination of the legal questions raised
by the motion.' 9 This provision enables the court to direct a verdict,
whether it accords with that rendered by the jury, or is contrary
thereto, or is entered in the absence of any jury verdict. This new
procedure on motion for directed verdict permits a greater use of this
method of determination of facts by both the trial and appellate
courts, inasmuch as consent of the parties to the reservation of juris2 -'
diction is not required..
2. New Trial
The considerations and legal principles that guide the judicial
discretion in directing a verdict are not the same as those called into
play when the trial judge considers granting a new trial on conflicting
evidence. The evidence produced on both sides may be legally sufficient- that is, there may be substantial evidence on both sides of
the disputed question, with the result that a motion for directed verdict
would necessarily be denied -and yet the mere legal sufficiency of
the evidence for either litigant, taken separately, does not prevent
the judge from granting a new trial. 2 ' The problem is, therefore, when
may a new trial be granted, even though there is substantial evidence
7

§54.17 (1949).
1 Saucer v. Vest Palm Beach, 155 Fla. 659, 21 So.2d 452 (1945); Carter v
Florida Power & Light Co., 138 Fla. 220, 189 So. 705 (1939); Stevens -'. Tampa
Elec. Co., 81 Fla. 512, 88 So. 303 (1921).
19Cf. Wigginton, supra note 11, at 27-28.
2
"Talley v. McCain, 128 Fla. 418, 174 So. 841 (1937) (holding, under the
prior law, that a ruling on the motion on the evidence cannot be reserved, at least
not without consent of the parties); see note 19 supra.
21
Craxettc v. l':rner, 77 Fla. 311, 81 So. 476 (1919).
1 FLA. STAT.
8
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to support the verdict?
When the trial judge refuses to set aside the verdict and denies a
new trial, there is a presumption on appeal that he exercised his
discretion properly; and because of this added presumption the case
is not presented to the appellate court as it was to him. 22 A strong
showing must be made before the appellate court will reverse the
judgment, since it represents a concurrent conclusion of judge and
jury. Thus, when there is substantial evidence to support the verdict,
and it is not shown to be clearly contrary to the manifest weight of
23
the evidence, the appellate court will allow it to stand.
The granting of a new trial is generally sustained when the conflicts
in the evidence produce a belief that the jury was motivated by
prejudice, passion, mistake, or any other improper cause.24 But when,
there being no ground for such belief, the trial judge is convinced
merely that there is difficulty in reconciling the verdict with the
manifest weight of the evidence or with the justice of the case as
conceived by him, and accordingly grants a new trial, he is less likely
to be sustained under present Florida law.
The Common Law Background. At common law the Statute of
Westminster 1125 fixed the practice in civil cases by providing m
Section 1 of Chapter 30 for the commissioning of nisi prius judges,
and in Section 2 for return of the "inquest" (verdict) to the King's
Bench and rendition of judgment there. The commission of the nisi
prius judge was exhausted as soon as the postea was sent to the full
bench at the conclusion of the trial. The complaining party could, for
a time, obtain his writ of attaint; 26 but this proceeding died out around
1600 and was never used in America.27 The new remedy furnished
for an improper verdict was a new trial. The Court of Common Pleas
once adopted the practice of granting a new trial upon the certificate
of the trial judge that the verdict was against his opinion; but that
22

Schultz v. Pacific Ins. Co., 14 Fla. 73 (1872).
E.g., Davis v. Turner, 118 Fla. 907, 160 So. 376 (1935); Jennings v. Pope,
10124Fla. 1476, 136 So. 471 (1931).
E.g., Carney v. Stringfellow, 73 Fla. 700, 74 So. 866 (1917); Schultz v,
Pacific Ins. Co., 14 Fla. 73 (1872); see First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of Miami
v. Wylie, 46 So.2d 396, 401 (Fla. 1950).
2513 EnW. I, c. 30 (1285).
2
GSee 3 BL. CONM. *389-390, 402-405.
27
See Wendell v. Safford, 12 N.H. 171, 175 (1841); Riddell, New Trial at the
Common Law, 26 YA.LE: L.J. 49, 54 (1916).
23
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practice never prevailed either in the King's Bench or, so far as is
known, in the Exchequer. 2 When the trial was at bar, however, new
29
trials were granted by the court sitting en banc in term.
It was recognized at an early date by the Florida judiciary that our
circuit courts are but partially in the position of the old nisi prius
court - and then only as to some procedural points such as entering
exceptions in the record. Their general function is rather that of the
Court of King's Bench sitting en banc trying cases at bar; they hear
the evidence, conduct the trial, render judgment, and even exercise
some appellate functions. 30 The common law trial at bar was not held
en banc or during term, but our circuit court trials do take place during
term. It appears, therefore, that our circuit judge is affording a trial
by jury as it was known at common law, even when he orders a new
trial for error of law or because the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence.
The distinction between review of the verdict by a trial court and
review in an appellate court took several years to develop. In the
early Florida cases the discretion of the trial court in ruling on
motions for new trial was conceded to be beyond the reach of the
writ of error, 31 and thus was practically immune to review. On that
writ the only questions concerning the evidence were whether it was
competent and whether the jury could have found the facts it did
from the evidence. 32 This restricted the appellate function to a narrow
degree, and required a "glaring departure" of the verdict from the
evidence - glaring to the extent that there was no competent evidence
33
- before the Supreme Court would reverse.
In 1859 the Court set
its rule for appellate review of instances of agreement by judge and
jury below: 34 "When there is conflicting evidence and the verdict is
28

See 8 BL. COMM. *388.
Cf. Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (K.B.
1757).
30
See Ex parte Henderson, 6 Fla. 279, 291 (1855).
3
XRandall v. Parramore & Smith, 1 Fla. 409 (1847); see Putnam v. Lewis, 1
Fla. 455, 471 (1847); Stewart & Fontaine v. Bennett, 1 Fla. 437, 443 (1847).
32
Randall v. Parramore & Smith, 1 Fla. 409 (1847).
33
Sanderson & Co. v. Hagan & Harrison, 7 Fla. 318, 326 (1857).
34
Tallahassee R.R. v. Macon, 8 Fla. 299, 305 (1859); that this rule was being
laid down for the appellate court, as distinct from the trial court, is indicated by
reference to the lower court as "the Judge" in the same paragraph. Ammons v.
State, 9 Fla. 530, 558 ( 1861 ), affirmed the rule for "this court," i.e., the Supreme
Court of Florida. For a recent confirmation see Driver v. State, 46 So.2d 718
(Fla. 1950).
29
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not manifestly against the weight of evidence, the Court will not
interfere to set aside the verdict of a jury."
In 1872, in a case involving two concurring verdicts and denial of
a motion for new trial, the mere fact that the Supreme Court would
have been willing to affirm a contrary verdict was held insufficient in
itself to warrant reversal.3 5
The Rule of Farrell v. Solary. By 1895 the Supreme Court of
Florida was faced directly with the problem of the weight to be
accorded the ruling of a trial judge in granting a new trial. 36 There
had been two consecutive trials and two verdicts for defendant, with
a verdict for plaintiff in a third trial granted him along with a change
of venue. Upon appeal by defendant, the Supreme Court took the
position that the trial judge had a better opportunity than an appellate
court to pass upon the propriety of the determination of the jury; and
accordingly it affirmed his authority to grant any number of new
trials as against verdicts not supported by or contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. 3 7 The principle was summarized as follows: 38
"... the order of the trial judge granting a new trial should not

be disturbed unless it appears affirmatively from the record that
there has been an abuse of sound discretion, or that some settled
principle of law has been violated."
In 1901, in Farrell v. Solary,3 9 the Court laid down at some length
40
the orthodox rule of review consistently followed until recent years:
"A trial court should not grant a new trial on the ground that
3 5Wilson

v. Dibble, 14 Fla. 47 (1872).
SOReddick v. Joseph, 35 Fla. 65, 16 So. 781 (1895).
37
The appellate court is less inclined, however, to affirm a second award of
new trial after two similar verdicts based on the same evidence, see, e.g., Farrell
v. Solary, 43 Fla. 124, 133, 31 So. 283, 286 (1901); Reddick v. Joseph, 35 Fla. 65,
71, 16 So. 781, 782 (1895); cf. 3 BL. COMM. *387.
3
SReddick v. Joseph, 35 Fla. 65, 70, 16 So. 781, 782 (1895).
3943 Fla. 124, 31 So. 283 (1901) (Maker of promissory note admittedly altered
due date provisions so as to lessen period by 20 days; he testified after his default
that defendant-endorser had consented to this alteration; defendant denied this
when sued as endorser; upon verdict for plaintiff-holder in due course based on
the conflicting testimony of these two witnesses only, judge granted motion for
new trial, which order was affirmed on writ of error).
4Old. at 131, 31 So. at 286.
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the verdict is not supported by the evidence where there is a
material conflict in the evidence unless the weight of the testimony so clearly preponderates against the verdict found, as to
require its annulment in order to meet the demands of justice.
But trial courts, of necessity, are vested with discretion in
granting or withholding new trials. And where they grant one
on the ground that the evidence does not sustain the verdict in a
case in which the evidence is conflicting upon a material issue.
an appellate court will not reverse such order unless it is
affirmatively and clearly made to appear, from a clear and
palpable preponderance of evidence in support of the xerdict
overturned, that the trial judge has abused the discretion with
which he is vested in such cases, or that some settled principle
of law has been violated. Simply because an appellate court, from
the showing made in the record before it, might not have granted
the new trial had it acted in the first instance in place of the
trial judge, or because it would not under the same circumstances
have disturbed a ruling denying such new trial, furnishes no
reason of itself to an appellate court for reversing an order of a
trial judge granting a new trial."
The opinion clearly distinguishes between the function of the trial
judge in rex iewing the evidence, including the testimonv and demeanor of the witnesses, for the purpose of ruling on a motion for new
trial, and the function of the appellate court in reviewing the evidence
actually in the record for the purpose of deciding whether the trial
judge has abused his discretion. It is axiomatic that the convincing
power of evidence can seldom, if ever, be accurately portrayed by the
cold words of the record, which may well show substantial evidence
for each party and yet indicate no preponderance. This is preeminently
the type of situation in which the position of the trial judge is superior
to that of the appellate court in determining whether the verdict is a
proper one; he observes at first hand the conduct of the parties and
the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses.
The rule of the Farrell case renders difficult any reversal of an
order granting a new trial. The trial judge is placed in such a position
that he can determine for himself the weight of the evidence , can
consider its legal sufficiency, and, even after finding sufficient e idence
to warrant denial of a motion for directed verdict, can still set aside
a verdict rendered against what he considers the manifest weight of
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the evidence. 41 Moreover, he can do this secure in the knowledge that
his judgment will not be set aside on appeal unless a clear preponderance of the evidence in the record demonstrates that he has
abused his discretion. The result is that he can weigh the evidence
himself in considering a motion for new trial unless he overrides a
clear preponderance favoring the verdict; and the onus in attacking
recently
his ruling falls on the appellant. This rule has been used 4as
2
as 1948 to sustain an order granting a motion for new trial.
The Rule of Seaver v. Stratton. In Seaver v. Stratton43 Mr. Justice
44
Terrell expressed the following rule:
"If there was substantial competent evidence in support of
the verdict, whether or not it preponderated in favor of the
plaintiff was not for the trial court to determine ....
"When it is shown that the jury is deceived as to the force
and credibility of or is influenced by illegal and improper
evidence or influenced by considerations outside the evidence,
the Court may set its verdict aside and grant a new trial but when
nothing is involved but the sufficiency of and probative force
of the evidence, the trial court is under no circumstances
warranted in pitting his judgment against that of the jury. It
is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial when the verdict
finds ample support in the record and no illegal evidence is shown
to have gone to the jury and nothing can be accomplished
except to have another jury review the cause."
It is readily apparent that the second paragraph of the foregoing
quotation refers in the first sentence to illegal and improper evidence
only; to say that the Court may grant a new trial when the "force
41
Carney
42

v. Stringfellow, 73 Fla. 700, 74 So. 866 (1917).
Knudsen v. Hanlan, 160 Fla. 566, 36 So.2d 192 (1948).
43133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335 (1937) (Yacht was sold for partial cash payment
and promissory note of third parties; dispute arose between vendor and purchaser,
after default in payment of note, as to whether it was accepted in absolute payment or merely as collateral for balance due on purchase price, and also as to
whether defendant-purchaser was outside Florida upon accrual of cause of action,
so as to toll running of three-year limitation period; motion for directed verdict at
close of plaintiff's testimony was denied; after verdict for plaintiff, motion for
new trial was granted; this order of circuit court was reversed on writ of error).
44 1d. at 187, 183 So. at 337.
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and credibility" of proper evidence is involved, but may not do so
when its "probative force" in involved, would be meaningless.
By virtue of this rule, several orders for new trial have been
reversed, some of them very recently.4 5 When there is substantial
competent evidence in the record, the trial judge cannot properly
direct a verdict against the party producing it; and when substantial
competent evidence appears for both parties, he must send the case
to the jury and must affirm the verdict unless improper evidence has
been admitted or unless passion, prejudice, or mistake on the part of
the jury is demonstrated, even though he is firmly convinced that the
preponderance of the evidence lies the other way. This is a more
limited discretion than that accorded the trial court under the Farrell
rule; in fact it is virtually no discretion at all.
The trial court's dilemma is found in the concurrent application of
both the Farrelland the Seaver rules. This is illustrated by Knudsen v.
Hanlan,46 in which the decision, based on the Farrell rule, sustained
47
the new trial, and, in the same volume of the reports, Urga v. State,
in which the majority, adopting the Seaver rule, reversed the order
for new trial while the dissenters, following the Farrell rule, would
have affirmed it. Today the sixty-four dollar question is: Which rule
is the Supreme Court going to use this time?
II.

TRIAL COURT WITHOUT JURY

1. Motion for Directed Verdict
In those cases in which a jury is waived, the procedure is the same
as that in jury trials. A motion for directed verdict should not be
granted when there is substantial evidence for the adverse party.48
The trial judge, in a ruling on the evidence as a matter of law, performs exactly the same function that he does when a jury is present.
After ruling as a matter of law, he then acts as a jury and weighs
the conflicting evidence.
45

- Edwards v. Miami Shores Village, 40 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1949); White v. E.
Levy & Sons, 40 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1949); Miami Beach v. Silver, 38 So.2d 305
(Fla. 1949); Urga v. State, 160 Fla. 740, 36 So.2d 421 (1948); Albert v. Miami
Transit Co., 154 Fla. 186, 17 So.2d 89 (1944); Hart v. Held, 149 Fla. 33, 5 So.2d
878 (1941).
46160 Fla. 566, 36 So.2d 192 (1948).
47160 Fla. 740, 36 So.2d 421 (1948).
48 E. E. Alley Co. v. Ball, 102 Fla. 1034, 136 So. 704 (1931).
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2. Motion for New Trial
The Court has recently stated without further discussion that the
scope of review when a jury has been waived is the same as that
governing review of a verdict;4 9 by statute, litigants in an action at
law may by agreement try a case without a jury, and the judgment is
in such event as effectual as on verdict.50 This issue has not been
completely clarified in the cases, however; another opinion expresses
the view that the weight to be given to a finding of fact made below
is a matter to be decided by the appellate court for itself. 51
III.

REFMEE

The finding of a referee will not be disturbed as against the weight
of the evidence unless the preponderance against it is "very clear"
or unless it appears to be based on mistake, passion, prejudice, or
corruption. 52 The judgment of the referee goes into the records as the
judgment of the court that appointed him; for the purposes of the case
he is, so to speak, the court. 53 If his findings are supported by substantial evidence the aggrieved party has the burden of showing error.
This is the rule applied either when the trial court sits without a jury
or when the findings of the jury are concurred in by the trial judge.5 4

IV.

ARB RATOR

An award of a board of arbitration is entitled, upon appeal, to that
respect due the judgment of a court of last resort. 55 When the statutory
requirements" have been substantially followed,5 7 the parties have by
40
Cassels v. Ideal Farms Drainage Dist., 156 Fla. 152, 23 So.2d 247 (1945);
Jernigan v. Harrison, 136 Fla. 320, 186 So. 511 (1939).

50FLA. STAT.
51

§54.10 (1949).

See In re Alkire's Estate, 144 Fla. 606, 623, 198 So. 475, 482 (1940) (supplemental opinion); this case, however, involves review in probate, although the
dictum is not so limited.
52
Hodges v. Fries, 84 Fla. 63, 16 So. 682 (1894); Broward v. Roche, 21 Fla.
465 (1885).
53FLA. STAT. §56.04 (1949), State ex rel. Sanchez v. Call, 36 Fla. 305, 18 So.
771 (1895).
54
E.g., Wilson v. T. A. Monk, Inc., 140 Fla. 797, 192 So. 407 (1939); see
Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Partridge, 58 Fla. 153, 157, 50 So. 634, 636 (1909).
55
Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe, 67 Fla. 154, 64 So. 742 (1914).
50

57

FLA. STAT. c. 57 (1949).

Payne v. McElya, 90 Fla. 900, 107 So. 241 (1925); Readdy v. Tampa Elec.
Co., 51 Fla. 289, 41 So. 535 (1906).
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their own agreement substituted by permission of law a tribunal of
their own choosing outside the judiciary; and to permit review of the
merits by the regular courts would destroy the very purpose and
utility of arbitration.5 8 Therefore, the umpire and arbitrators are considered the sole and final judges of the evidence; there is no prox ision
for bringing it as such before an appellate court.5 9 Their award, unless
impeached by what is virtually a collateral attack on one of the grounds
and in the manner provided by statute,6 0 is conclusix e on the merits
of the cause. 6 1
V.

COUNTY JUDGE'S COURT

The judge of the county judge's court hears and sees the witnesses.
while the appellate courts do not; therefore it follows logically that
neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court should interfere v, ith
his conclusions of fact when there is substantial evidence to sustain
them and his procedure is free from error. In other words, if he
reasonably could have reached the conclusions he did, they should not
be disturbed. '
Yet in this type of review also there are conflicting rules. The
Donnelly rule, expressed by Mr. Justice Thomas, is that ...
the
conclusion of the probate court on conflicting evidence will not be
disturbed unless the legal effect of the proof has been misapprehended
'3
This rule ha
or there is a lack of evidence to support the findings."
been specifically applied in 1950. 64 The problem arises, however, as
to just what "the legal effect of the proof" is. Does this phrase signify
all the evidence, taken as a whole; or, whenever there is substantial
evidence to sustain the findings of the probate judge, does the rule
forbid the circuit judge to reverse, regardless of where in his estimation the preponderance of the evidence lies? In the Donnelly case
58

Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 78 So. 188 (1916).
' Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917).
60
FLA. STAT. §57.07 (1949) limits grounds for impeachrient to fraud, corruption, gross negligence, or misbehavior on the part of an umpire or arbitrator, or
evident mistake acknowledged. FLA. STAT. §§57.06 and 57.08 (1949) specify the
procedure to be followed in attempting to set aside his award in the trial court.
61 Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917).
G21n re Manney's Estate, 42 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1949); In re Donnelly's Estate,
137 Fla. 459, 188 So. 108 (1938).
63
1n re Donnelly's Estate, 137 Fla. 459, 48:3, 188 So. 108, 117 (1938).
64
Gair v. Lockhart, 45 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1950).
59
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evidence to sustain the decisions of the probate judge, reversed by
by the Supreme Court, was regarded
the circuit court but reinstated
65
majority.
the
by
as "ample"
In re Alkire's Estate,66 following a year later, likewise resulted in a
rehearing and a split in the Court. Although Mr. Justice Whiffield
paid lip service to the Donnelly rule, he nevertheless persuaded a
and summed up the proper
majority to proceed on the opposite6 tack,
7
follows:
as
review
probate
basis for
"The mere presence in the record of substantial evidence to
sustain the decree or judgment appealed from is not enough to
justify an affirmance. The legal effect of the entire evidence as
it is duly made a part of the record on appeal, as well as the law
on the issues made, should be considered and determined by the
appellate court in the process of adjudicating an affirmance or a
reversal of the decree or judgment on appeal."
Once again, the question today is: Which rule is the Supreme Court
going to use this time?
VI. ADmnmISTATVE

AoENCY

If there is substantial evidence as a basis for the finding of fact of
an administrative agency, the court is to refrain from weighing the
evidence or comparing it with the evidence offered in refutation. 68 In
the case of such agencies as the Railroad Commission 69 or the occupational boards,70 the circuit court should not overturn orders of the
651n re Donnelly's Estate, 137 Fla. 459, 484, 188 So. 108, 118 (1938).
60144 Fla. 606, 198 So. 475 (1940).
671d. at 625, 198 So. at 483 (supplemental opinion).
O8 fBecker v. Merrell, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So.2d 912 (1944); Laney v. Board of
Public Instr'n, 153 Fla. 728, 15 So.2d 748 (1943). See Note, Judicial Review of
Administrative Findings of Fact: The Doctrine of JurisdictionalFacts in Florida,
2 U. oF FLA. L. 11Ev. 86 (1949).
69
Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876
(1930). FLA. CONST. Art. V, §35, specifically authorizes the Legislature to clothe
any railroad commission with "judicial" powers; but most administrative agencies,

when exercising the "quasi-judicial" function, are today allowed the same degree
of authority in finding facts.
70Hammond v. Curry, 153 Fla. 245, 14 So.2d 390 (1943). Mandamus will of
course lie to compel action of some sort when an administrative agency refuses to
function at all; cf. State ex tel. Hollywood Jockey Club, Inc. v. Stein, 129 Fla. 777,
176 So. 849 (1937).
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agency based on substantial evidence. Until recently, however, little
weight has been accorded the findings of the Industrial Commission.
It was regarded for quite some time as an agency confined to the
mere taking of testimony; 71 its findings were given ". . . about the
same weight and consideration which the chancellor should give to
the findings of fact by a special master appointed by the court for that
purpose."7 2 Today, however, the full commission is coming into line
as a fact-finding authority, although, for some odd reason not vet
explained by the bench, the deputy commissioner, who actually hears
the testimony and observes the witnesses, is relegated to the position
73
of a mere recording clerk.
The effect of the present law governing the weight of findings of
fact by a master is discussed infra in Part VII, inasmuch as this bears
a close relationship to the present status of findings by the Industrial
Commission. The other commissions have more rapidly attained the
category of the chancellor receiving the evidence personally. They are
the triers of fact; they come to the conclusions that they deem appropriate on the evidence presented to them; and the circuit court is
acting strictly as an appellate court when it reviews a cause.7 4 Hence
the same rule of appellate review is used.
VII. SUIT IN EQUITY

In analyzing the weight due to findings of fact by the chancellor,
the various methods of taking the testimony must be considered
individually. It is here that the greatest confusion exists.

1. Master Selected by Chancellor to Find Facts
One of the most common current means of arriving at the facts in
equity suits is the appointment of a special master to hear the testimony and, in many instances, to make findings of fact and law
thereon. 75 When the master makes findings in which the chancellor
concurs, these are given the weight of a verdict; if there is substantial
71

E.g., Star Fruit Co. v. Canady, 159 Fla. 488, 32 So.2d 2 (1947).
Firestone Auto Supply & Service Stores %.Bullard, 141 Fla. 282 , 192 So. 865
(1940).
73
E.g., Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, 46 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1950); Sanford
v. A. P. Clark Motors, Inc., 45 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1950) (deputy commissioner
reversed by full commission, reversed in turn by circuit court, reversed in turn by
Supreme Court).
74
E.g., Miami v. Huttoe, 38 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1949).
75
FLA. STAT. §§63.54-63.65 (1919), providing for appointment of masters.
72
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evidence in the record to support them, they should be affirmed. It
is pertinent to note that the Court sometimes relies on administrative
review cases to sustain this position. 70 From the nature of the procedure no valid distinction appears between the two fact-finding
agencies; accordingly the opinions on this point should be interchangeable as precedent. It will be interesting, however, to see whether the
Court will in future cases employ the terminology applied to a verdict
or will continue the "abuse of discretion" phraseology.
When the chancellor disagrees with the master on the findings of
fact, Harmon v. Harmon77 forbids him to reject them unless "clear"
error is established, and upon successful objection to them before the
chancellor the appellee bears in the Supreme Court the burden of
sustaining their rejection. In view of the fact that the chancellor has
appointed a master presumably competent and has delegated to him
the duty of finding the facts from the evidence, coupled with the
additional further fact that the latter alone has heard all the testimony
and observed all the witnesses, the chancellor is in a less favorable
position than the master to make the determination. The chancellor
has nothing but the cold record of the proceedings; and in this
respect he is in no better position than the Supreme Court to review
them. As a result, there is no presumption in favor of the chancellor's
contrary findings when there is substantial evidence to support those
of the master. 78 One wonders whether the Supreme Court will
similarly bind itself, as it logically should on this reasoning, in respect
to the findings of a commissioner appointed by it for the same
70
purpose.
Prior to the Harmon case 80 the position of a chancellor reviewing
findings of a master appointed by him had been regarded as similar
to that of a trial court ruling on a motion for new trial; s ' but the
Harmon decision in effect rejects this view as inconsistent with the
70
E.g., Blanchard v. McCord, 40 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1950); Means v. Bateman,
39 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1949); both cases cite Miami v. Huttoe, 38 So.2d 819 (Fla.
1949), and Nelson v. State ex rel. Quigg, 156 Fla. 189, 23 So.2d 136 (1945).
7740 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1949).
781d. at 213. Of course, the master's findings can and should be rejected when
predicated on rio evidence at all, e.g., Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 46 So.2d 602
(Fla. 1950); this is "clear" error on his part.
79It does utilize a commissioner on occasion, e.g., State ex rel. Davis v. Avon
Park, 117 Fla. 565, 158 So. 159 (1934).
80
Harmon v. Harmon, 40 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1949).
81
E.g., Empire Lumber Co. v. Morris, 102 Fla. 226, 135 So. 508 (1931).
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proper distinction between jury trials and equity suits as actually
conducted. When a trial court is ruling on motion for new trial, the
judge hears the evidence, observes the witnesses, and is at least as
competent as a juror to estimate the worth of the testimony. In equity,
however, in those instances in which the chancellor does not hear
the testimony personally, he cannot conceivably be in the position of
a trial judge at law in dealing with questions of fact. Furthermore,
when a new trial is ordered the cause of action is not determined until
the new trial is had and judgment rendered; but when the chancellor
modifies the findings of a master he arrives at a final decision.
A verdict is subject to two different reviews: one by the trial judge
and one by the appellate court. It does not reach the appellate court
until it has been approved or disapproved by the trial judge. Under
the Farrellrule,8 2 which was unquestionably the one in effect at the
time the decisionsa in equity prior to Harmon were rendered, the trial
judge can set aside the verdict whenever he regards it as contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence; and when he does so the burden
of establishing error on his part rests on the appellant. Under the
Seaver rule,8 4 however, the appellee must affirmatively justify the
action of the trial judge; the appellant, to obtain reversal, need
demonstrate no more than the existence in the record of substantial
evidence in support of the rejected verdict. The real difference between the two rules is the extent of the evidence necessary to warrant
disapproval of the verdict by the trial judge. The Harmon case evidently follows the Seaver rule; it regards the master as a jury, functionally speaking, and insists that if he has substantial evidence before
him his findings of fact should be left undisturbed., 5 The language
in the opinion is definite, it might be added, but the action of the
Supreme Court was not; the chancellor was permitted to change one
important finding of the master, in spite of "considerable testimony"
in the record supporting it.86
2. Master Approved by Parties to Find Facts
Although not all jurisdictions make a distinction in those instance
in which the parties agree to the submission of disputed questions of
82

See p. 287 supra.
See note 88 infra.
84
See p. 289 supra.
85
Harmon v. Harmon, 40 So.2d 209, 218 (Fla. 1949).
86 1d. at 211.
83
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fact to a master, Florida has adopted the policy of according added
importance to the findings of such a master.87 They carry the weight
of a jury verdict, regardless of whether the chancellor accepts them.88
This distinction, however, is unimportant when the chancellor approves
of them; and even when he rejects them the practical importance of
this policy is not readily apparent, inasmuch as the findings of the
master must be accepted unless shown to be "clearly erroneous" even
though the master is one selected by the chancellor alone.8 9 Yet this is
the rule applied to jury verdictsY0
It may be argued that the chancellor in the Harmon case would not
have been allowed to override the finding of domicile on conflicting
testimony if the master had been the choice of the parties, but the
opinion contains no language to this effect. The distinction, if any, is
of degree and is slight; and in any event it is of no import unless the
master's findings are disapproved by the chancellor. The trend is to
place the master in the position of the jury, regardless of whether the
appointment is made by the chancellor alone or by agreement of the
parties.
8. Chancellor Taking Evidence Himself
The same rule is applied to the findings of fact of the chancellor
who personally hears the evidence; the burden is on the appellant to
show that the chancellor erred if there is substantial evidence in the
record supporting his findings. 91 Although the decisions normally place
the findings of a chancellor who has not heard the testimony on a
lower plane than that of a verdict,92 there is a strong presumption in
871d. at 213.

88McAdow v. Smith, 127 Fla. 29, 172 So. 448 (1937); Kent v. Knowles, 101
Fla. 1375, 183 So. 315 (1931); Groom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460,
57 So. 243 (1911).
89
Harmon v. Harmon, 40 So.2d 209, 213 (Fla. 1949).
90
See Part I, 2 supra.
91
E.g., Bailey Motor & Equip. Co. v. Cullison, 42 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1949);
Mercer v. Mercer, 41 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1949); Means v. Bateman, 39 So.2d 478
(Fla. 1949); Foxworth v. Maddox, 103 Fla. 32, 137 So. 161 (1931).
92
E.g., State v. Fort Pierce, 133 Fla. 848, 182 So. 774 (1938); Century Trust
Co. of Baltimore v. Allison Realty Co., 105 Fla. 456, 141 So. 612 (1932); Bowery
v. Babbit, 99 Fla. 1151, 128 So. 801 (1930); Gagnon v. Magic City Lumber Co.,
98 Fla. 270, 123 So. 757 (1929); Shippey v. Shippey, 97 Fla. 881, 122 So. 272
(1929); McCamy v. Payne, 94 Fla. 210, 116 So. 267 (1928); Mock v. Thompson,
58 Fla. 477, 50 So. 673 (1909). If a majority of the Supreme Court happen to
agree with the chancellor, however, even on evidence not heard by him, he will
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favor of the correctness of the findings of a chancellor who personally
hears the testimony and receives the evidence; and unless an "abuse
of discretion" or "clear" error is affirmatively shown his conclusion
93
will stand.
4. Master Appointed Merely to Report Ecidence
A special master may at times be appointed for no other purpose
than to report evidence. 94 The chancellor is not then in any better
position than is the appellate court to determine probative value or
credibility; and as a logical consequence his conclusion should not be
accorded more than the deference due to a skilled review of the
evidence. Nevertheless, "clear" error is necessary to warrant re-,ersal
of his findings. 95
CONCLUSION

The more recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida are
pointed toward reduction of the scope and importance of the role of
the trial judge or chancellor. While errors of substantive law, and
procedural errors of any practical importance in the particular case,
will be dealt with on appeal if left uncorrected below, a difficult
problem of review arises in connection with the so-called facts of the
case, which are "found" from the evidence introduced.
The Farrell and Seaver rules,", though alike in some respects, are
in the final analysis irreconcilable. Under both there must be substantial evidence to warrant a jury verdict. In the absence thereof,
motion for directed verdict should be granted, since there is no
function for the jury to perform. Under both the jury should be called
be sustained, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 46 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1950); Acheson v. Acheson, 46
So.2d 13 (Fla. 1950).
93E.g., contrast Joseph Langer, Inc. v. Finston & Co., 45 So.2d 338 (Fla.
1950), and Hastings v. Hastings, 45 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1950), with Carlson v.
Becker, 45 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1950), Saliba v. Saliba, 160 Fla. 959, 37 So.2d 536
(1948), Florida Nat. Bank of Gainesville v. Sherouse, 80 Fla. 405, 86 So. 279
(1920), and Carr v. Lesley, 73 Fla. 233, 74 So. 207 (1917). See State v. Fort
Pierce, 133 Fla. 348, 351, 182 So. 774, 775 (1938); .Magill v. Sherman, 129 Fla.
797, 804, 176 So. 795, 798 (1937); Farrington v. Harrison, 95 Fla. 769, 770, 116
So. 497 (1928).
94McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479, 71 So. 836 (1916).
5
. E.g., Bethea v. Langford, 45 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1949).
9
6See Part I, 2 supra.
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upon if there is substantial evidence on both sides, that is, evidence
sufficient to enable one "reasonable" man to reach a conclusion in
favor of one party and another "reasonable" man to reach the opposite
conclusion. Under both a new trial should be awarded when two
factors are present: (1) evidence improperly admitted, or demonstrated prejudice or passion or actual moral dishonesty on the part of
the jury; and (2) a showing that some such factor influenced the
verdict.
Strictly speaking, the improper admission of evidence, or the use
of a disqualified juror, is an error in procedural law. It is also apparent
that a determination that some extraneous factor has influenced the
jury in reaching its verdict is normally an objective judgment on the
part of the judge; the only person who knows subjectively whether a
given juror has been swayed by improper considerations is that juror
himself -and even he may not be conscious of his bias. In other
words, the judge must, and does, decide for himself whether the
evidence as a whole preponderates against the verdict; if he concludes that it does, he presumes that the verdict rests at least in part
97
on one or more of these factors shown to exist when they should not.
If, however, he regards the verdict as in accord with the weight of
the evidence, his presumption is the opposite, and the error is passed
off as "harmless."9 8
There is still another type of situation, namely, that in which substantial evidence on each side has been introduced and nothing im97
1n

the very recent case of Trice v. Loftin, 47 So.2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1950), the
Court, in attempting to square the Seaver rule with an application of the Farrell
rule, stated:
"Our adjudications sustain the view that if a trial judge, after hearing all
the testimony adduced by the respective parties litigant, reaches the conclusion
that he has difficulty in reflecting the justice of the cause with the verdict of the
jury and the weight of the evidence, then as a matter of law it becomes his
duty to award a new trial. Likewise, if the jury's verdict fails to square with
right and justice of the controversy and reasonable doubt exists in the mind of
the trial court to conclude that the jury, in the consideration of the case, acted
through sympathy, passion, prejudice, mistake or the verdict as rendered reflects an arbitrary or capricious action in weighing or considering the testimony
and the instructions of the court upon the law, then the ends of justice require
that the verdict be set aside and a new trial awarded."
Hence it may be that there is no necessity for the demonstration of extraneous
factors that influence the jury's determination; the trial judge may assume the
existence of such factors simply because the verdict, in his opinion, "fails to square
with right and justice."
98
See note 2 supra.
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proper has occurred in the fact-finding process itself, yet the judge
simply cannot see how any reasonable man could reach the verdict
rendered in view of what to him is a "manifest" weight of evidence
pointing the other way. Can he order a new trial? Said Mr. Chief
Justice Taylor in the Farrellcase, he can ". . . grant one on the ground
that the evidence does not sustain the verdict in a case in which the
evidence is conflicting upon a material issue . . . .";9' and the award
of a new trial should not be reversed on appeal merely ". . . because
there was evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict ....-100
Said Mr. Justice Terrell in the Seaver case, ". . . when nothing is
involved but the sufficiency of and the probative force of the evidence,
the trial court is under no circumstance warranted in pitting his judgment against that of the jury."10 1
Two diametrically opposed rules appear, yet neither decision has
been expressly overruled. The same conceptual conflict emerges in
probate in connection with reversal by the circuit judge of the judgment of the judge of the county judge's court on the ground of "clear"
discrepancy between the evidence as a whole and the latter's findings,
as highlighted by the Donnelly and Alkire cases.1 0 2 Again, neither
decision has been openly discarded.
Adoption of one rule or the other must of course stem from considerations other than these rules themselves. Basically, is the judgejury process one, or is the trial judge sitting in review on the opinion
expressed by the laymen in their verdict as a jury? Does the specific
organic prescription that "supervision" as well as "appellate" jurisdiction shall be exercised by the circuit court in probate 0 3 signify
anything, or is it pure verbiage? Is the lay mind, largely untrained
in sifting and weighing evidence and usually susceptible to appeals to
passion and prejudice made by clever counsel, such an ideal medium
for determining the conclusions of "fact" that a trained mind is unnecessary in any capacity other than as linesman in the game? Is the
final solution of those complex probate problems such as undue
influence and intent of the testator best entrusted to one that need
not even be a member of the bar?
Undoubtedly, the less the opportunity for new trial or reversal, the
99Farrell v. Solary, 43 Fla. 124, 132, 31 So. 283, 286 (1901).
1Old. at 130, 31 So. at 285.
1 1
0 Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 188, 183 So. 335, 387 (1937).
' 0 2See Part V supra.
3
10 FLA. CONST. Art. V, §11.
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greater the speed in reaching final determination. From this, of course,
it could logically be argued that all cases should be tried by a municipal judge without a jury, and with no right of appeal. This would be
the essence of speed. But in those relatively few close cases producing
disagreement between judge and jury, just how important is speed
04
as a component of justice?'
A search in the Supreme Court opinions for an answer to these
questions, or for even an analysis of them, yields nothing, essential
though they are to any intelligent determination of the rule that
should be followed. The Court has simply created of late a policy of
discouraging new trials or reversals, thereby rejecting decades of
precedent and virtually eliminating whatever purpose the trial judge
formerly served in contributing to the fact-finding process.
The same tendency is being shown in equity, as illustrated by the
warning in the Harmon case' 0 5 that the chancellor should not reject
the findings of fact made by the master unless these are "clearly"
erroneous. And yet, at the very same time, the treatment of the findings
of the deputy commissioner of the Industrial Commission proceeds
squarely in the opposite direction; the binding determination is made
by the Commission on review. 106 Again, one searches in vain for an
explanation of this patent inconsistency. Either the individual hearing
the testimony and observing the witnesses is best qualified to appraise
its worth or he is not. A decision on this point, which is basic, must be
made one way or the other, if reasoning is to be used at all in arriving
at a policy to govern review of findings of fact.
Disregarding the deputy commissioner, however, it can be stated in
broad fashion that the different fact-finding bodies throughout Florida
procedure are gradually being brought under the same rule, whether
they be lower courts, administrative agencies, referees, arbitrators,
masters or juries. The rule emerging today is that their findings are
not to be reversed, or a fresh start made, unless substantial evidence
4

H-igh cost to the litigant is also a factor of major importance on occasion;
and in recent cases the Supreme Court has demonstrated a commendable de1o

termination to combat this evil in those instances in which it can do so, e.g.,
Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Clark, 42 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1949); Coast Cities
Coaches, Inc. v. Miami Transit Co., 41 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1949); Cohn v. Cohn, 160
Fla. 619, 36 So.2d 199 (1948). But to save costs by terminating the litigation
before the cause can be properly tried below, even if "proper" trial involves a
new trial, is of highly doubtful expediency.
' 05 Harmon v. Harmon, 40 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1949).
'

06

See Part VI supra.
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is lacking or unless improper factors are shown to have influenced
those findings. The motion for new trial, as distinct from motion for
directed verdict, is rendered largely insignificant other than as a
remedy in the original proceeding for harmful error of law therein;
the discretion formerly exercised by the trial judge has been drastically curtailed. So has the traditional authority of the chancellor, in
formulating his decree, to modify the findings of the master, even
though the decree still constitutes the first official judicial disposition
of the suit.
Discretion to determine how much weight either the trial court or
the appellate court should accord to findings of fact lies entirely in
the Supreme Court; and in reaching this formulation of principle it is
not bound by precedent. 10 7 There is little doubt of its power to change
the rules governing such matters whenever it chooses to do so. What
it does, therefore, takes on an added importance. The Supreme Court
has accomplished much in promulgating through its opinions definite
rules for the review of findings of fact in several types of situations
embodying this process. Nevertheless, as regards jury verdicts, findings
by a master in chancery, and findings by the probate judge, the most
that can be said at present is that the trial judge or chancellor may
well find that he is wrong, whatever he does. The scales are weighted
somewhat in favor of doing nothing; his best bet is to place his stamp
of approval on the findings, regardless of whether he considers them
accurate. This trend has definitely appeared in recent years, even
though a valid reason for it has not.
In any event, even a diminution of the role of the trial judge or
chancellor is preferable to a different role in each case, with no method
of determining what it is until his part has been played. It is to be
hoped that the progress made in formulating principles for such determination in other types of review will soon be exhibited in these
areas that remain confused.

10 T

See In re Alkire's Estate, 144 Fla. 606, 623, 198 So. 475, 482 (1940)
plemental opinion).
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